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A B S T R A C T
The tasks of disaster risk monitoring and early warning are an important means of improving the eﬃciency of
disaster response and preparedness. However, although the current works in this area have sought to provide a
more accurate and better technological infrastructure of systems to support these tasks, they have failed to
examine key features that may aﬀect the decision-making. In light of this, this paper aims to provide an un-
derstanding of the decision-making process in control rooms for disaster risk monitoring and early warning. This
understanding is underpinned by a conceptual framework, which has been developed in this work and describes
factors that inﬂuence the decision-making. For doing so, data were collected through a series of semi-structured
interviews and participatory observations and later evaluated with members of the control room of the Brazilian
Center for Monitoring and Early Warning of Natural Disasters (Cemaden). The study ﬁndings provided a solid
basis for designing the conceptual framework of the essential factors required by the decision-makers. These
factors are separated into two groups: 1) the “dimensions” of decision-making (i.e., the type of hazard, the phase
of the disaster risk, the location, and area of expertise of the operators) and the “pillars” of decision-making (i.e.,
the tasks, their required information, useful data sources, and the decision rule). Finally, the contributions
achieved in this study may help operators to understand and propose proactive measures that could improve
their decision-making, overcome uncertainties, standardize the team's decision-making, and put less pressure on
operators.
1. Introduction
Communities from diﬀerent countries all over the world have been
aﬀected by the growing occurrence of disasters, which in 2015, in-
curred ﬁnancial losses close to US$100 billion worldwide and caused
23,000 fatalities [38]. These disasters are a potentially damaging
physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss
of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or
environmental degradation [33,24,18]. A disaster is thus triggered by
natural hazards, which can be natural (geological, hydrometeorological
and biological) or induced by human processes (environmental de-
gradation and technological hazards) [18]. Geographically, diﬀerent
locations are more or less exposed to these diﬀerent types of hazards.
Hazard and exposure are well known and the concepts that are easy to
understand. By contrast, vulnerability is a complex concept, and
disciplines have several ways of deﬁning, measuring and assessing it.
The concept involves the characteristics of people and groups that ex-
pose them to harm and limit their ability to anticipate, cope with and
recover from harm [62]. Disaster risk is determined probabilistically as
a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity. It is the
potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which
could occur to a system, a society or a community in a speciﬁc period
[18].
In this manner, early warning systems (EWS) have been established
to protect people by enabling action in advance to reduce risks and
impacts [6]. Together with a technological infrastructure for data col-
lection and analysis like decision support systems [27,44,37], as well as
decision analysis models [26,15], EWS also denotes a social process that
occurs at diﬀerent spatial scales and involves decision-making [25].
There are some chains with several types of data, information,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.01.034
Received 8 September 2017; Received in revised form 28 January 2018; Accepted 28 January 2018
⁎ Corresponding author at: Center for Mathematics, Computation and Cognition (CMCC), Federal University of ABC (UFABC), Santo André, Brazil.
E-mail address: ﬂavio.horita@ufabc.edu.br (F.E.A. Horita).
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 28 (2018) 22–31
Available online 31 January 2018
2212-4209/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
T
knowledge, experts, stakeholders, practitioners, policymakers, citizens
involved in this social process. Monitoring available information1 and
making a decision to issue warnings about potential disaster risks are
often carried out in a control room, which is staﬀed by operators for
analyzing environmental variables, identifying potential hazards and
vulnerabilities, and communicating warnings with an emergency re-
sponse team [36,49]. These control rooms have been established not
only for disaster risk management, but also areas of interest, such as
nuclear power plants [30,11,63,31], mineral processing plants [28,29],
and oil reﬁneries [48].
Since social aspects of a control room impact the way how decisions
taken, they have been examined in research works existing in the lit-
erature [30,11,63,31]. However, although these works have resulted in
a better understanding of the procedural, cultural, and social aspects of
control rooms in diﬀerent scenarios, the challenge now is to recognize
how those factors can inﬂuence decision-making in control rooms for
disaster risk monitoring. This is particularly important once activities
carried out by operators are often aﬀected not only by the cognitive
skills of each operator [3,14,29] but also by communication and col-
laboration between them [32,14,3]. As stated by Reed [45], decision-
making preferences in organizations are often inconsistent, unstable,
and externally driven; the linkages between decisions and actions are
loosely-coupled and interactive rather than linear.
On the basis of this challenge, this study investigates the following
research question: what are the factors that inﬂuence the decision-making
process in a control room for disaster risk monitoring and early warning?
The ﬁrst stage in answering this question was achieved in our previous
work when a preliminary version of the decision-making process was
modeled by means of a standard modeling notation [21]. This version
was later extended and reﬁned in another work [19], which also sought
to link the tasks of the decision-makers with existing data sources. This
paper goes beyond the modeling and development of diagrams that
described the decision-making process by interpreting the factors that
could inﬂuence it. The interpretation is supported by a conceptual
framework that was based on a case study that was conducted within
the control room of Cemaden. Hence, this work not only consolidates
and extends our previous works but also provides the following new
contributions:
• Conceptual framework: A framework is proposed for con-
ceptualizing the relationship between the factors that inﬂuence the
decision-making process. These factors can be described as “di-
mensions” (i.e., the type of hazard, the warning phase of the dis-
aster, the location, and area of expertise of the operators) and
“pillars” (i.e., the tasks, their required information, useful data
sources, and the decision rule) of the decision-making process in the
control room.
• Case study: Lessons were learned from the case study within the
control room of Cemaden and formed the basis of the conceptual
framework.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst outlines the
conceptual basis of this work. Following this, Section 3 describes the
research method employed for conducting this work, as well as the
study settings, i.e., Cemaden, its control room, and existing monitoring
systems. On the basis of this, Section 4 describes the ﬁndings of the
study, which are discussed in Section 5. Eventually, Section 6 reaches
some conclusions and makes suggestions for future work and research
lines.
2. Background
2.1. Disaster management and early warning systems
Disaster management presents as an important alternative to
achieve this resilience and, as a consequence, avoid or, at least, reduce
the impacts caused by natural disasters [5]. It follows a continuous
process, which consists of activities that are executed before, during
and after a disaster. These activities in turn are separated into four main
phases (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery). The mon-
itoring of diﬀerent variables (e.g., structural, environmental, and so-
cial), as well as decisions of issue warnings are deﬁned in the pre-
paredness phase, which aims to reduce potential damages caused by a
disaster [43,57]. Early warning systems (EWS) indeed play a critical
role for supporting these tasks, and because of this, enhancing EWS is
one of the seven targets of Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Re-
duction to minimize disaster risks and save lives [52].
EWS are deﬁned as a “set of capacities needed to generate and
disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable in-
dividuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to
prepare and to act and in suﬃcient time to reduce the possibility of
harm or loss” [54] For doing so, they consist of four interrelated ele-
ments [27,6,56]. To start with, the ﬁrst element is risk knowledge
which requires a systematic collection and analysis of data and should
include a dynamic assessment of hazards and physical, social, eco-
nomic, and environmental vulnerabilities. The second element is
monitoring and warning that should have a good scientiﬁc basis for
predicting and forecasting hazards and a warning system that operates
24/7. While the third interrelated element focus in the communication
and dissemination of warnings that contain clear messages and useful
information to enable proper responses. Last but not least, the response
capability element is essential to ensure eﬀectiveness of EWS, i.e.
people should understand their risks and know how to react [53].
2.2. Control rooms
Eﬀectiveness EWS requires a proper monitoring of variables of in-
teresting in order to ensure that accurate warnings of potential events
are issued in time. Control rooms are particularly important to support
these tasks. This is because they are staﬀed by operators that are re-
sponsible for analyzing environmental variables, identifying potential
hazards and vulnerabilities, and communicating warnings with a re-
sponse team [36]. Consequently, they are a core element in diﬀerent
levels of chains at spatial locations from national to local organizations.
In the same manner of any other organization, control rooms can be
also characterized by “a series of interlocking routines, habituated ac-
tion patterns that bring the same people together around the same ac-
tivities in the same time and places” [61]. These however can be lo-
cated within an organization, or as an organization itself. Their
activities are thus often aﬀected by factors that can be the complexity
and variety of several data collection tools, as well as the variety of
external and internal factors that aﬀect control room operators [49].
Example of external factors are a broken rainfall gauge, or the re-
strictive national laws, and on the other hand, an internal factor may be
organizational policies for communication among operators.
Control rooms can be found in nuclear power plants [30,11,31],
mineral processing plants [28,29], oil reﬁneries [48], emergency
warning systems [36,23,3,49]. Although these existing works in-
vestigate the physical design of a room and its technological tools, only
few of them are focused on analyzing organizational theory and issues
[9,60,50]. Yang et al. [63] studied the eﬀects of computer-based pro-
cedures on the performance of operators in nuclear power plants, in-
cluding factors, such as mental workload and situational awareness. Li
et al. [29] examined human factors in the complex and dynamic en-
vironment of mineral processing plants. Furthermore, Weick [59] in-
vestigated an air control system incident with the aim of identifying its
1 We understand “data” as a single and unorganized raw value that is provided by a
speciﬁc source. It requires a processing in order to obtain its meaning. While, the term
“information” allows us to expand our knowledge about a speciﬁc data by means of or-
ganizing and structuring it, which in turn provide a meaning of such raw value.
Therefore, a required information may consists of a single element or a complex structure
of data.
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failure issues. Results of this work showed that interruption of routines
(e.g., loss of communication among operators) when combined may
incur into a small errors, and, thus, an overall event.
2.3. Decision-making process in control rooms
Decisions are intrinsic in the daily activities within control rooms;
for example, if a traﬃc engineer requires data about the condition of
the roads when deciding on what is the appropriate traﬃc ﬂow [36].
Both tangible and intangible factors aﬀect the success or failure of a
decision but a decision-maker still requires suitable data when making
decisions. Otherwise, he/she might simply have to depend on his/er
own experience and this might result in a wrong decision and raise
questions about his reliability and eﬃciency [51,45].
In the case of disasters, before control room operators can make
informed decisions and issue accurate and useful warnings, they usually
analyze information from diﬀerent types of variables (e.g., the water
level inside the riverbeds and volume of rainfall) in a short period of
time. For this reason, attempts have been made in both the literature
and common practices to develop decision support systems
[27,58,44,37] that would be able to support decision-making. For ex-
ample, Picozzi et al. [42] devised an early warning tool for earthquakes
which provides alert messages within about 5–10 s for seismic hazard
zones, while Alﬁeri et al. [2] analyzed a European operational warning
tool for water-related disasters. Another line of works are focused on
developing decision analytical models that provide a better under-
standing of how to use required variables, and thus improve decision-
making [40,15,12]. Within this group, Kou and Wu [26] proposed a
multi-criteria-based decision model that could be employed for ana-
lyzing existing medical resources and providing their optimal alloca-
tion. Furthermore, Comes et al. [13] presented an approach that sup-
ports decision-makers under fundamental uncertainty by suggesting
potential developments scenarios.
Although these works provided relevant contributions to improve
decision-making in disaster management, none of them investigated
these decisions as an organizational process within control rooms. Here,
it is worthwhile to mention the work of While Weick [59] that ex-
amined an air control system and indicated the interruption of im-
portant routines, together with a broken communication chain among
operators, as two factors that may trigger small errors into major dis-
asters. This study is closely related to this work; however, we are fo-
cused on modeling the decision-making process, and then examined the
inﬂuencing factors. In other words, a process can be modeled as a set of
connected activities using information and communication technolo-
gies, which lead to a closed outcome providing a measurable beneﬁt for
a customer” [41]. On the basis of a modeled decision-making process,
operators and coordinators are able to analyze and deﬁne proper de-
cision models, which may ﬁt to the goal of activities. Thus, decision
analytical model should be recognized as beyond the scope of this work.
3. Method
3.1. Study settings: The Cemaden
In Brazil, preventive countermeasures have been taken to mitigate
loss and damage, as well as to improve the coping strategies employed
by communities against ﬂoods, droughts, and landslides. One of these
countermeasures was to set up Cemaden (in 2011), which is a branch of
the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation, and
Communications (MCTIC, in Portuguese). Since the establishment of
Cemaden, the number of monitored municipalities has grown from 56
in 2011 to almost 1000 in 2016, which represents 17% of all Brazilian
municipalities (5570 towns and cities). In parallel, the number of
warnings that were issued by the control room of Cemaden has also
grown during the last few years, i.e., 1353 (2014), 1762 (2015), 1983
(2016), and a total of almost 6500 issued warnings since 2011 when
Cemaden was founded. This growing number of monitored munici-
palities, combined with the number of issued warnings, illustrates the
complexity of the ongoing problem of disaster risk monitoring and is-
suing early warnings in Brazil.
For dealing with this scenario, Cemaden has been building a mon-
itoring system that consists of more than 4750 rainfall gauges, about
550 humidity and rainfall sensors, nine weather radars, and almost 300
hydrological stations. These sensors provide data on precipitation,
calculate the movement of weather systems, and forecast the weather
conditions (e.g., rain). In addition, the center also works in collabora-
tion with several institutions such as the National Water Agency (ANA,
in Portuguese), the Brazilian Geological Survey (CPRM, in Portuguese),
and the National Institute of Meteorology (INMET, in Portuguese) (see
Fig. 1). These provide further data about weather conditions, risk maps,
and environmental variables, which supplement the existing data of the
center.
All these diﬀerent types of data are monitored and used within a
control room for making decisions of whether or not issuing warnings
of potential hazards when adverse weather conditions are forecast. This
contains a video wall, which displays the data that is drawn on to
support the decision-making of a monitoring team (Fig. 2). The mon-
itoring teams work 24 h a day, throughout the entire year, in a con-
tinuous monitoring cycle that is divided into six-hour shifts, starting at
midnight. They comprise a team of seven to eight members that include
Fig. 1. Scenario of disaster monitoring and early-warning in Brazil: overall institutions and information ﬂow.
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at least one specialist in each of the following areas of expertise: hy-
drology, meteorology, geology, and disaster management specialist.
In addition to the video wall, each member has a separate working
station where they analyze particular information on their own (Fig. 2),
e.g., a geologist may want to analyze data provided by geological
agencies (e.g., CPRM), while a hydrologist is more interested in data
from water resources agencies (e.g., ANA). While working, they can use
a decision support system, which integrates data from the monitoring
systems and displays integrated data on a geospatial dashboard. These
data are also analyzed by the teams to determine what warning level
should be adopted; on the basis of this warning level, relief agencies on
the ground can decide what kind of action should be taken.
Since previous knowledge and experiences of an area (like its
rainfall seasonality) are also essential when deciding whether or not to
issue a warning of a potential disaster, this makes decision-making
more empirical, although it is also highly subjective. Furthermore, the
task of issuing a warning and deciding on its level implies a high degree
of responsibility and puts pressure on the operators, which makes de-
cision-making more complex.
3.2. Study design and sampling
A case study was carried out as a part of the research methodology,
mainly because it is a means of investigating a contemporary phe-
nomenon in its context when the boundary-line between them may be
unclear [64,46]. Since the aim of this study is to analyze the decision-
making process of a control room for disaster risk monitoring and early
warning, the control room operators of Cemaden represent the subject
of the study and their daily business processes are the units of analysis
(or “case”). A set of analytical variables was employed to assist in the
collection and analysis of signiﬁcant information about the units of
analysis [64]. These included Activity, Sequence Flow, and Actor and
were derived from our previous work [22].
During the phase of data collection, semi-structured interviews and
direct observations were employed to gather qualitative data from
control room operators. Purposive sampling was adopted as a technique
for selecting participants for the qualitative study, i.e., those operators
who were working in the control room on the visiting day were selected
as the sample for the study. This method was chosen mainly because
control room operators have a very strict work schedule and are unable
to spend much time away from their regular activities; in view of this,
the best alternative was to approach them informally in their free time,
and not during their work shifts. The aim was to recruit as many par-
ticipants as possible and thus include a comprehensive and appropriate
number of individual cases for the study.
Collected data were then used for preparing a diagram that describe
the decision-making and reveal inﬂuential factors. This diagram was
modeled with the aid of Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN)
[41], which is a standard model that is used in research for the task of
modeling business processes in diﬀerent application domains. After this
diagram has been modeled, it was further evaluated with control room
operators. Purposive sampling was also conducted during the free time
of the participants (i.e. between their work shifts). It is also worth
mentioning that no a priori ﬁxed sample size was set in any phase of the
case study.
3.3. Data collection
Data were collected during the period January 19th-22nd, 2016 and
on February 1st, 2016 at the Cemaden headquarters in São José dos
Campos, Brazil. During these periods, 88 warnings were issued from the
control room to the National Center for Disaster and Risk Management
(CENAD, in Portuguese), at the Nacional Civil Defense (SEDEC, in
Portuguese) (see Fig. 1). Direct observation sessions were conducted
following a study protocol and with a limited degree of interaction by
the researcher (observer) and the subjects. This meant that the observer
was only regarded as a researcher and did not interact with the subject
or interfere with the subjects' activities [46]. The aim of these sessions
was to gather data about the day-to-day activities and interactions of
the subjects without interfering with their work.
Individual, face-to-face interviews were also conducted with the aim
of obtaining data about the business activities of the participants. Open-
ended questions were asked, and these guided the course of the inter-
views. There were 10 semi-structured interviews with members of the
control room comprising two geologists, two hydrologists, two me-
teorologists, and four disaster analysts and these took place at the
workplace of the participants. This represented 30% of all the members
that were working in the control room, all of whom have had at least
one year's experience there. Since the interviewers were working within
strict time constraints, the interviews took no more than 35min and all
of them were audio-recorded.
The data collection was carried out by a Ph.D. Student with a
background in business process modeling and information systems. His
work was supervised by a Researcher with a background in the so-
ciology of disasters and early warning systems and a Professor with a
background in information systems and disaster management. This in-
terdisciplinary teamwork was important since it provided a solid basis
for conducting all the phases of the study.
3.4. Data analysis
The audio-recording from the interviews was used for transcribing
Fig. 2. Video wall in the control room of CEMADEN.
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each of them verbatim, i.e., the transcription included every word of the
audio-recording and so represented just the way it was said. The ana-
lysis and classiﬁcation were conducted in two distinct phases.
In the ﬁrst stage, the analytical variables used during the data col-
lection were again employed as a basis for deﬁning a coding technique
for the classiﬁcation and analysis of the data. Coding is “a method that
enables you to organize and group similarly coded data into categories
or “families” because they share some common characteristics” [47].
The coding scheme was then employed to classify the content of each
transcription. This analysis relied on the NVivo Data Analysis Soft-
ware.2 The second phase was based on the coded data, and consisted of
modeling the decision-making process, by means of BPMN. This mod-
eling centered on the business process that covers the analysis of all the
coded data assigned to the “Activity” and “Sequence Flow” categories of
the coding scheme (see Supplementary materials). Signavio Modeling
Platform3 was used for supporting in this task (Table 1).
3.5. Data evaluation
Focus group sessions were held with the aim of obtaining practical
feedback on the model diagram, as well as assessing recommendations
for improvements and/or discovering new ideas. Focus groups can be
regarded as a social research method that allows a group of people
(4−8) to provide data about a speciﬁc topic by means of informal
group interaction [39]. A protocol was created to guide the work during
the sessions, which consisted of unstructured and open-ended ques-
tions. Two focus group sessions were held on August 23rd, 2016 at the
control room of Cemaden with teams that were working in shifts (as
summarized in Table 2). Six people attended the ﬁrst session - one
meteorologist (M), one disaster analyst (D), two hydrologists (H), and
two geologists (G) - while the second session consisted of seven people -
two geologists (G), one hydrologist (H), two disaster recovery analysts
(D), and two meteorologists (M).
The focus group sessions were conducted by the Ph.D. Student
under the supervision of the Researcher and Professor. The participants
of the focus group session were the only people present in the room.
3.6. Ethical statement
This study fully complied with the ethical and legal principles
governing scientiﬁc research with human beings, drawn up by the
School of Arts, Sciences and Humanities of the University of So Paulo
and took into account the requirements laid down by the Brazilian
National Board of Health. All the participants signed the Informed
Consent Form. The interviews and focus group sessions were conducted
in Portuguese because it was the native spoken language of the parti-
cipants. They were also audio-recorded by means of a smartphone. The
subjects were not paid anything for their participation in the sessions.
Moreover, the participants were not given immediate feedback after the
interviews and focus group sessions, although the ideas and results
obtained in this study will eventually be shared with the CEMADEN
community during a workshop at the center.
4. Findings
When examining the feedback of the control room operators on the
decision-making process, the focus group data was divided into two key
areas: the “pillars” of the decision-making process and the “dimensions”
of the control room for disaster risk monitoring and early-warning.
4.1. The pillars of decision-making process
The results of the focus group sessions provide qualitative data that
decision-making in the control room is linked to four areas: 1) tasks; 2)
required information for informed decision-making; 3) decision rules
that make sense of the available data; and 4) accurate data sources.
Interestingly, during the phase of data collection at Cemaden, con-
trol room operators were reticent in regarding of the decision-making
process. This was mainly because they did not know how this process
would be and why it could be important for their work. However,
during the phase of data evaluation, we could understand that opera-
tors have a tacit knowledge about their daily activities, which turned to
be useful in their own opinion, as one of the meteorologists stated:
“It [the decision-making process] helps the operator. For example, I
followed all the predetermined tasks; if something unexpected happened
it was because it was not covered by the process.”
The participants also thought that the decision-making could be
speeded up once they know what their activities are and what data and
information they have to look for. This is consistent with a previous
analysis of the work in the control room [36], which found there were
disruptions in information ﬂow and a work overload among the control
room operators when there was a lack of appropriate tools and action
protocols. However, Militello et al. [36] only analyzed the information
ﬂow between diﬀerent control rooms, whereas this paper is concerned
with analyzing the decision-making process.
Furthermore, control room operators believe that training can ca-
pacity them to making better decisions or even improving them. It is
worthwhile to mention that the operators did not have any training
and/or drills since Cemaden's creation in July 2011. Indirectly, they
recognized that their decisions have uncertainties and they want to
reduce this vulnerability. As a geologist stated:
“Decision-makers will be trained to know how the existing processes and
decisions should be carried out, and thus be prepared for making better
decisions or even improving them.”
Table 1
Summary of the methods of data collection.
# Method Subjects Period (min) Objective
1 Direct observation – 120 To analyze activities in the monitoring room
2 Direct observation – 60 To analyze the shift of a monitoring team and the use of available systems
3 Direct observation – 150 To analyze the communication in the monitoring room
4 Interview 2 Meteorologist 35/45 To collect data of the subject's daily activities
5 Interview 2 Hydrologist 21/46
6 Interview 2 Geologist 30/33
7 Interview 4 Disaster Mgmt Spec 48/22/33/30
Table 2
Summary of focus group sessions.
# Participants Period Objective
1 6 people (1M, 1 D, 2 H, 2 G) 60min Evaluate the generated model
diagrams2 7 people (2 G, 1 H, 2 D, 2M) 60min
2 http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo.
3 http://www.signavio.com/.
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A clear understanding of the decision-making process also provides
a basis for understanding the interactions and relationships among the
operators. This can not only help them to analyze any inconsistencies
and avoid misunderstandings but also manage conﬂicts within the
teams during the daily activities (e.g., the power inequalities among
experts in relation to the unrecognized expertise of disaster manage-
ment analyst, or the pressure to issuing early warning for several cities
when emergency situations appear [60]). An example of this devalued
expertise of disaster analyst is expressed by the obligation to perform
administrative tasks when the other experts are performing scientiﬁc
analysis of hazard monitoring using meteorology, hydrology and
geology knowledges. Disaster experts expressed their vulnerability in
the organization trying to highlight some information regarding people
exposed to ﬂoods and landslides and/or physical vulnerability of
buildings in these risk-prone areas:
“My job is not restricted to administrative tasks (e.g., ﬁlling in forms or
issuing warnings). I am also responsible for providing data to the other
members about the vulnerable community (e.g., the number of buildings
located in an area at risk).”
Furthermore, the results from the focus group sessions also provided
evidence that decision-making is closely related to an understanding of
what information is available and how it can be combined to detect a
potential disaster through a decision rule. For example, a hydrologist
requires data about the volume of rainfall and water level of riverbeds
in order to predict the risk of ﬂooding.
This required information is aﬀected by the quality of the shared
data, and location of the available data sources, such as hydrological
stations and rainfall gauges. The uncertainties caused by the huge vo-
lume of available data or the condition of the data collection tools,
should be also taken into account when making decisions. As one me-
teorologist pointed out:
“The forecasting of rainfall depends on having available tools, and ef-
fective meteorological stations; it also requires data that are updated and
reliable because the rainfall gauges might not be properly calibrated.
Unfortunately, some municipalities do not have any available tools,
which means one is monitoring ‘in the dark’.”
Indeed, forging a relationship between tasks, required information,
decision rules, and data sources is a crucial issue. With regard to this, a
geologist made the following comment:
“You know how things should work and are thus suitably prepared to
make a decision or even improve the decision-making process.”
A meteorologist echoed the geologist's comment on the importance
of understanding the basic principles of decision-making which he
supplemented by pointing out that “this could help in the management of
the team members; for example, when you have to hire a new member.”
4.2. Dimensions of the control room for disaster risk monitoring and early-
warning
The results of the study showed that the tasks carried out in the
control room can often be divided into four key areas: 1) phases of
warnings; 2) determining the type of hazard; 3) the location of warned
areas, and 3) the expertise of the operators.
With regard to the phase of issuing warnings, according to the
participants, the status of a warning could fall into one stage of the
following sequence phases: (a) Analysis; (b) Opened; (c) Kept; (d)
Ceased; and, (e) Under Review.4 The participants emphasized the fact
that the required tasks and their sequence ﬂow may change during
these phases and thus there could be evidence of further activities. For
example, in the “Under Review” phase, the warning is analyzed with
regard to its quality, while in the “Kept” phase, the disaster manage-
ment specialist could investigate the occurrence of disaster damages
and losses reported by the media in an aﬀected area. A diﬀerent set of
tasks, information, and data sources are required to assist in the deci-
sion-making.
In the same manner, the decision-making process is also aﬀected by
the diﬀerent types of hazards that might share several common features
but could also have idiosyncrasies. For example, the volume of rainfall
at a speciﬁc city/town and/or region can be used to assist in the fore-
casting of both ﬂoods and landslides; however, the water level in a
riverbed that is essential for ﬂood forecasting is hardly useful for
forecasting landslides.
The location of data monitoring also aﬀects the decision-making,
especially because of the territorial size of Brazil where many diﬀerent
kinds of weather systems can be found. Moreover, each area has its own
speciﬁc environmental features, e.g., the geological setting of the
Mountainous Region of Rio de Janeiro is more susceptible to landslides
than that of the Center region of São Paulo. At the same time, urban
settings also play a critical role since locations with inhabitants are
more hazardous than rural areas. Furthermore, the characteristics and
state of buildings are also essential in the decision-making, as pointed
out by the meteorologist:
“A warning about a landslide in the Mountainous Region of Rio Grande
do Sul takes a completely diﬀerent form from the Mountainous region of
Rio de Janeiro because the buildings are stronger than those in the shanty
towns.”
The diﬀerences between the environmental, urban, and residential
settings mean that the decision rules and required information change
from one location to another, e.g., a decision rule may determine that
the rainfall threshold of the volume of rainfall of the Metropolitan
Region of São Paulo is 60mm in 24 h, while, the threshold for the
landslide-prone areas between Jaboato dos Guararapes and Recife cities
could change to 40mm.
Furthermore, the results of the focus group sessions showed that the
decision-making process is also aﬀected by the expertise of each
member of the monitoring team, as well as how these members should
interact in their teams. This was made evident when a geologist ex-
plained the role of the disaster analysts, although the geologist did not
identify the role of disaster analyst in the risk analysis cycle:
“For example, it could be raining in a region. The geologist predicts the
risk of several landslides; however, none of them will occur in an urban
area. Here, the disaster analyst can help me as well [to identify what is
the vulnerability].”
The role of meteorologists in the decision-making process also de-
monstrated the level of expertise among the members of the control
room. The interactions among the diverse experts of the team is dif-
ferent. Further information often required to meteorologists, which
sometimes did not have their competences well deﬁned. The concept of
disasters, in the most parts of interviews, is attached to the idea that
disasters are caused by rains. As a geologist stated:
“I have often asked the meteorologist: ‘Is it going to rain? Is it a high-risk
potentially critical situation? Is it likely going to cause a disaster critical
event?’.”
4 The ﬁrst stage of a warning is “Opened”, i.e., an adverse condition has conﬁrmed by
the operators and a warning should be sent to the National Civil Defense (SEDEC). After a
warning is opened, the operators continuously monitor the area until the adverse con-
dition is ceased. So, the warning moves to the stage “Ceased”. In case of the operators
identify that the adverse condition will remain, they move the warning to the stage
(footnote continued)
“Updated”. When a warning is updated, the operators can keep the warning level, in-
crease (e.g., from moderate to high), or decrease (e.g., from very high to moderate).
Finally, the last stage of a warning is called “Under Review” and it indicates that an
operator is examining disaster data collected about the warning for establishing a time-
line of the event and evaluating the eﬀectiveness of the warning. This is also used as
historical data for learning process.
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A kind of decision-making that is only centered on the analysis of
meteorologists increases the uncertainties of the process. In contrary,
when a decision is made on the basis of risk modeling and events
forecasting, it is able to standardize the team's decision-making, as well
as overcome uncertainties, by allowing the specialists to share their
responsibilities and putting less pressure on them. Apart from this, a
decision-making that relies only on the analysis of meteorologists
overloads the work of these specialists, and hence makes their decision-
making more vulnerable and prone to human errors. Moreover, during
emergency situations, sensors and meteorological reports are subject to
failures and real-time decision-making can no longer be based on dy-
namic data.
4.3. Conceptual framework of factors that inﬂuence decision-making in
control rooms for disaster risk monitoring and early-warning
On the basis of the two key areas presented in the previous sections,
a conceptual framework is proposed here as a way of describing factors
that inﬂuence decision-making in control rooms for disaster risk mon-
itoring and early-warning. This framework then consists of two essen-
tial groups of elements, as displayed in Fig. 3: 1) the “pillars” of deci-
sion-making that is illustrated as a triangle; and 2) the “dimensions” of
decision-making represented by the ellipses.
The performance of monitoring teams is closely related to the
“pillars” of decision-making, the operators of the control room feel
more conﬁdent when they are following a deﬁned process. In turn, this
process may be centered by a decision rule, which draws the relation-
ship between a) the tasks of the decision-making process, b) their re-
quired information, and c) useful data sources. By understanding this
process, when the decisions are speeded up, every member can un-
derstand their role in the process (e.g., what their tasks are, what in-
formation is required, and what data sources are analyzed). This kind of
understanding also makes the operators more conﬁdent about making
decisions. There are two reasons for this: 1) they are following a pre-
determined protocol and 2) they can be trained to be more specialized
in the activities that they have to carry out.
On the other hand, the results of this study also suggested that the
“pillars” of the decision-making process should be adapted and driven
by not only the traditional elements of the risk framework for broad
structural policies (Vulnerability + Hazard + Exposure) [16], but also
by a supplementary element named Temporality (i.e., the warning
phase of disaster). Table 3 details each element of the framework. To-
gether, these elements constitute what we named as the “dimensions”
of decision-making, i.e., the type of hazard, the warning phase of the
disaster, the location of hazardous-prone areas, and area of expertise of
the operators. Understanding the links between two essential groups of
elements is particularly valuable as it highlights areas of improvement
in the overall decision-making process. This is because an action pro-
tocol should provide a guideline of essential activities but not constrain
the monitoring team which is liable to happen because of the inherent
dynamics of disaster management.
5. Discussions and implications
Control rooms are indeed an essential feature of early warning
systems (EWS) and, thus, disaster management, largely because they
trigger countermeasures and responsive actions if there is a hazardous
situation, e.g., the imminence of a disaster. Therefore, this work pro-
vided lessons that were learned from a case study within Cemaden.
Firstly, the establishment of an action protocol could provide
guidelines for monitoring teams, by reducing the need to depend on
their own experience, assessing the workload of the operators, im-
proving the reliability of the decision-makers, and making it possible to
track the information required for decisions. The ﬁndings of this study
provided empirical evidence that professional Bourdieu's habitus arises
when no process is established. In other works, this behavior indicates
the tendency of people to maneuver their body in certain ways that they
are used to, e.g., posture and more abstract mental habits, modes of
perception, classiﬁcation, appreciation, and feeling [8]. As a turn, more
complex multidisciplinary discussions have emerged.
Secondly, given the importance of decision-making, a proper
method for designing action protocols should be tailored by inﬂuencing
“factors” and “dimensions” (Fig. 3). These factors corroborate the re-
sults of the analysis conducted by Altamura et al. [3] on the social and
legal signiﬁcance of the concept of “uncertainty” in an early warning
insofar as they enforce the need for an analysis when for an analysis a
decision-making process for control rooms. In line with past works that
investigated failure chain of control rooms [9,59,60], this work en-
larges the importance of a decision-making process for control rooms as
a means of reducing possible errors. This also supplements other re-
search that is focused on investigating the uncertainties that face the
decision-makers for disaster management [35,14,10]. As participants
mentioned during th e focus group sessions, operators feel more con-
vincing when they recognize the full scope of their activities (i.e., the
required information, data sources, and decision rules).
Thirdly, available systems and decision models should be aligned
with the decision-making process; otherwise, they might become use-
less, by making the tasks complex and delaying the decisions. As a re-
sult, both cosmology episode [60] and habitus [8] may come back into
the spotlight, and thus wrong decisions could be taken. This study
ﬁnding supplements previous research works on the development of
decision analytical models for disaster management and control rooms
[40,26,15] insofar it approaches the problem from another perspective,
i.e., the decision-making process itself as a sequence of tasks, required
information, actors, and data sources. This result is consistent with
other studies in the literature that analyze key aspects of decision-
making for disaster management [28,29,55]. Our study adds to these
previous works by oﬀering a conceptual framework (Fig. 3), which
reﬁnes the factors that help to deﬁne the way decision-making is car-
ried out in the control rooms for disaster risk monitoring and early
warning. This framework is also particularly valuable for a better un-
derstanding of how computer-based procedures (e.g., decision support
systems and decision models) can be implemented in the main control
room.
Forth, when traditional data sources are damaged, inexistent, or not
well calibrated, crowdsourcing and volunteered information may be
Fig. 3. Conceptual framework of factors that inﬂuence decision-making in control rooms
for disaster risk monitoring and early-warning.
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adopted as a supplementary source. Results obtained in this study also
suggest that the condition of data collection tools implicates decision-
making in control rooms, as it was mentioned by participants during
interviews and focus group sessions. Since control room operators are
making decisions far away of a vulnerable region, their judgments rely
on data provided by existing monitoring equipment. Therefore, when a
data collection equipment is not proper working, operators could de-
cide “in the dark” without knowing the “real” situation in the area; this
occasionally may lead to devastating consequences due to a wrong
decision. This conclusion is in line with previous works that in-
vestigated decision-making and human factors in diﬀerent control
rooms [9,29]. For overcoming this challenge, common people can
provide reliable and accurate volunteered geographic information from
vulnerable areas [17], which thus supplements traditional data collec-
tion tools and enhances decision-making in control rooms [20,1,34,19].
Findings of this work however show that as any other information, this
should reﬂect the decision-makers' requirements, otherwise it may be
useless or even misused.
In summary, these lessons that were learned from the case study,
together with the conceptual framework, provide contributions that are
useful not only for operators but also coordinators in guiding the es-
tablishment of a control room in diﬀerent application areas. Although
we believe these results are of great signiﬁcance for research and
practice, there are limitations to our study which should be recognized.
The conceptual framework could be useful in several other application
domains for understanding their decision-making process; for example,
control rooms of nuclear power plants, air traﬃc control, oil factories.
However, while these examples demonstrate the potential of the fra-
mework, its rigorous evaluation through the systematic application in
several other scenarios is still required to establish the generality of the
framework, which is beyond the scope of this work.
6. Conclusion and future works
The aim of this paper has been to understand the factors that aﬀect
decision-making in the control room for disaster risk monitoring and
early warning. Semi-structured interviews and participatory observa-
tions were conducted in a qualitative analysis project, which was con-
ducted in the control room of Cemaden. The results obtained in this
analysis showed that members of the control room tend to draw on
their previous experiences and knowledge in their decision-making
when there is a lack of a clear strategy. As a result, control room op-
erators become more concerned and worried about the way they are
making decisions. At the same time, this increases uncertainty in de-
cision-making since operators do not know what activities they are
supposed to carry out which kind of information can be regarded as
“additional information”, and what data sources should be analyzed.
On the basis of these concerns, our framework describes the es-
sential features (the “pillars”) of a decision-making process, i.e., a) the
tasks involved, b) the required information, c) the decision rules that
are designed to make sense of the information, and d) the required data
sources. The results of the study showed that these are the essential
components of the decision-making processes that assist in carrying out
the activities of control rooms for disaster risk monitoring and early
warning. Furthermore, the framework provides a set of “dimensions”
that characterize the decisions made in the control room, such as the
expertise of the members, the warning phase, types of disasters, and
geographic location. The results provided evidence that there is a strong
relationship between the essential features of decision-making and
these dimensions. In other words, the dimensions inﬂuence the way
that the tasks are carried out by monitoring teams, e.g., control room
operators will not analyze the water level of a riverbed (the task) when
making decisions related to landslides (the type of hazard). This also
aﬀects the required information, decision rules, and analyzed data
sources. For example, a hydrologist will not analyze weather fore-
casting (task), since it is assigned to a meteorologist (expertise area).
Future lines of research should also be noted. Given the nature of
the ﬁndings of this study, there is still a need to conduct further case
studies in diﬀerent organizational settings, which could support the
generalization of the contributions achieved in this study. In addition,
more participatory observations should be conducted in the control
room to extend the acquired knowledge basis, especially during a dis-
aster situation such as that occurred in the Mountainous Region of Rio
de Janeiro in 2011, before the Cemaden creation. The conceptual fra-
mework should be also applied and evaluated in other applications
domains; for example, control rooms that aim at monitoring and issuing
warnings of tornadoes or earthquakes, as well as control rooms of a
nuclear power plant, which has distinct requirements of a control room
for disaster management. These further evaluations have the potential
to provide a new understanding or improve the body of knowledge on
factors that inﬂuence decision-making in control rooms.
Moreover, although a sequential process is useful for supporting
decision-making, in some cases it may become pointless due to the
uncertainty of resources or existing information. For example, an action
protocol may determine that a control room operator must issue an
alert using data from rainfall gauges; however, in one particular case,
he/she does not found an equipment installed at the location. In this
context, there is an emerging trend to adopt reference task models to
assist in disaster management [7,4], which is a deﬁnition of universal
elements that can be employed by organization developers to solve a
speciﬁc task at a given time. As a result, this could meet the need for a
more ﬂexible decision-making process and more resilient during dis-
aster situations [60].
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Table 3
Elements of the conceptual framework.
Group Element Description
Dimensions Hazard This indicates the type of hazard, e.g., earthquake, ﬂood, or storm.
Temporality This element is associated with the phase of a disaster, e.g., preparedness, or response. However, it could be also adopted for indicating
periods within a speciﬁc phase, e.g., 24 h before the event, or 72 h after.
Local vulnerability Location and characteristics that make it an area susceptive to a disaster.
Expertise area The expertise area of control room operators, e.g., hydrologists, traﬃc control, or physicist.
Pillars Tasks Tasks that are performed by control room operators and also constitute a decision-making process.
Information requirements A set of information required for performing tasks. It can be represent by either a simple data item or complex data structures but rather
than a data source.
Decision rules The functions or rules that can be used for supporting the tasks. This could be a decision table, or an analytic model (e.g., hydrology
model).
Data sources Data source is associated with all resources that could used for providing a speciﬁc data value, e.g. a report, an institution, or an
information system. In other words, this represents the source of data rather than the data (or information) itself.
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